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RICHARD R. JOHN
The half-century following the Civil War witnessed an epochal trans-
formation in American telecommunications. In the 1870s, the tele-
graph network became a spawning ground for a remarkable spate
of inventions that included the phonograph and the telephone, and
around 1900 the telephone network became the first electrical com-
munications medium that network providers intended to be accessi-
ble to the entire population. This transformation was a centerpiece
of the still unprecedented burst of inventive activity that economic
historians call the Second Industrial Revolution.1
This essay builds on recent historical writing, as well as my own
research, to sketch some of the ways in which this transformation was
shaped not only by market trends and technological imperatives, but
also by governmental institutions and civic ideals. It is intended as a
study in the centrality of politics to the making of what is today some-
times called the information infrastructure.2 My thesis can be simply
put. To understand the transformation of American telecommunica-
tions, one must locate the telegraph and telephone networks in their
political as well as their economic setting, or in what contemporaries
would have called the political economy.3
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3. By political economy, I mean the relationship between the state and the











Today, it is customary to lump together the telegraph and tele-
phone networks as telecommunications. In the nineteenth century,
however, these two networks remained distinct. At their core, both
consisted of a small number of network providers that followed sepa-
rate, and, in some ways, divergent paths. In the case of the telegraph,
the dominant network provider was Western Union; in the case of the
telephone, the dominant network providers were the operating com-
panies licensed by American Bell (later AT&T). The Western Union
network was nationwide, the Bell network was regional and in cer-
tain instances city-based. This distinction shaped in various ways the
inventive process, which was regulated primarily by the patent office
and the courts. In addition, it affected the rates network providers
could charge and the rights-of-way they could obtain. For telegraph
network providers, rate-and-entry regulations were coordinated by
state and federal legislatures; for telephone network providers, by city
councils. As it happens, what might appear to be a minor difference
had major consequences for the way in which these two networks
evolved.
Until quite recently, historical writing on the telegraph and tele-
phone routinely discounted the extent to which the evolution of
Western Union and the Bell-associated network providers had been
shaped by the political economy. This was true even though it has
long been widely known that the telegraph network was jump-started
by a federal government grant and that the telephone network coa-
lesced around patent rights.
The relative unimportance of political economy to the creation
of the American telegraph network was implicit in Robert Luther
Thompson’s Wiring a Continent (1947), still the standard history of
the network’s beginnings. By 1860, Thompson contended, telegraph
promoters had concluded that the network was best coordinated by a
single provider, since it was a “natural monopoly.”4 In so doing, he
consigned to the dustbin of history Western Union’s many post-1860
challengers and obscured the extent to which the nineteenth-century
telegraph network had been shaped by governmental institutions and
civic ideals.
Thompson’s conclusion has recently been challenged, at least im-
plicitly, by a number of scholars.5 Even so, for many decades it predis-
posed historians and economists to discount the influence of politics
4. Thompson, Wiring a Continent, 342.
5. For a sampling of recent historical writing on the post-1860 telegraph net-
work that underscores the influence of politics on its evolution, see Blondheim,
“Rehearsal forMedia Regulation”; Carlson, “Political Instrument”; Hochfelder, “In-
dustrial Divide”; John, “Politics of Innovation;” John, “Te´le´graphie Publique”; and
Starr, Political Origins.
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on the telegraph. For Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Western Union was the
“first nationwide multiunit modern business enterprise,” making it,
along with certain railroads, of which the most important was the
Pennsylvania, the “most relevant administrative models” for the ar-
chitects of themodern industrial corporation.6 For Richard B. Du Boff,
Western Union was a technically backward monopoly run by grasp-
ing rentiers.7 Chandler and Du Boff differed widely in their charac-
terization of Western Union’s business strategy. Yet they agreed that
the firm remained essentially unregulated until the New Deal. For
Chandler, Western Union’s managers proved so effective in meet-
ing user demand that few called for federal regulation.8 For Du Boff,
Western Union’s lobbyists were so devious in manipulating the po-
litical process that they forestalled regulation for which there existed
great public demand.9 Tellingly, neither so much as mentioned the
National Telegraph Act, the cornerstone of post-Civil War federal tele-
graph regulation, even though the main provisions of this law were
well known.10 Indeed, Du Boff managed to write an entire essay on
post-Civil War federal telegraph regulation without so much as ac-
knowledging its existence.11
Historical writing on the early telephone network has followed
a similar pattern. Until quite recently, historians and social scien-
tists alike discounted the influence on its evolution of the political
economy in which it was embedded.12 This was true not only for his-
torians who admired the Bell-associated network providers’ business
strategy, but also for those who did not. The “immediate effects of
sociopolitical forces” that would later become so “dominant” in the
modern telephone network—Bell admirer George David Smith con-
tended, in summarizing a common view—were “negligible” early on;
as a consequence, the telephone network emerged in a “relatively
permissive political atmosphere.”13 The popularization of telephone
6. Chandler, Visible Hand, 197, 79.
7. Du Boff and Edward S. Herman, “New Business History,” 102–5.
8. Chandler, Visible Hand, 200.
9. Du Boff, “Communications Regulation.”
10. Herring and Gross, Telecommunications, 210, 353–54.
11. Du Boff, “Communications Regulation.”
12. For a sampling of recent historical writing on the pre-1920 telephone net-
work that underscores the influence of politics on its evolution, see Beauchamp,
“Telephone Patents”; Gabel, “Federalism”; John, “Vail”; John, “Recasting”; Mac-
Dougall, “People’s Telephone” (2005); MacDougall, “ People’s Telephone” (2004);
Maguire, “Local Dynamics”; and Starr, Political Origins.
13. Smith, Business Strategy, 199. Specialists in twentieth-century
government-business relations have reached an analogous conclusion. For
example, in a book that focused, in part, on twentieth-century telecommunications
regulation, Richard H. K. Vietor observed that, in the period before the New
Deal, the only economic sectors in which the federal government played a major
regulatory role were banking and transportation. Vietor, Contrived Competition, 3.
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service through its extension to underserved areas, Bell detractor
Milton L. Mueller claimed, “posed no special policy issue” and “re-
quired no government action.”14
Marginalizing the political economy in historical writing on early
American telecommunications built on, and helped shape, a long-
standing tradition of society-centered historical narratives on the
American past. Historians otherwise as diverse as Chandler, Thomas
P. Hughes, and William Cronon regarded it is an article of faith that
politics, however defined, did little to shape the epochal transforma-
tion of the United States from a struggling commercial republic on the
margins of Europe into one of the most powerful industrial nations
in the world. To be sure, Chandler, Hughes, and Cronon defined this
transformation in strikingly different ways. For Chandler, its hallmark
was managerial capitalism, for Hughes the large technical system, for
Cronon the industrial city.15 These differences notwithstanding, each
traced this transformation to factors unrelated to politics, even if one
construed politics broadly to embrace governmental institutions and
civic ideals. Authoritative historical writing, Cronon observed, in an
unusually candid reflection on the historian’s craft, entailed the im-
position of a coherent design on a crowded and disordered reality
through the foregrounding of certain elements and the omission of
others.16 For Chandler, Hughes, and Cronon, as well as the many
historians and social scientists that followed their lead, the political
economy was among the elements that could be safely left out.
In the past few years a small yet growing group of historians has
begun to reconsider the devaluation of politics in historical writing on
the United States. Spurred in part by anomalies in the reigning inter-
pretative paradigm, and in part by the emergence of a distinguished
body of social scientific writing on related themes, the new institu-
tionalists have reinvigorated a once-thriving trading zone between
14. Mueller, “Universal Service,” 368. Mueller expanded on this position in
Universal Service, an important revisionist monograph that credited the expansion
of the telephone network in the decades that immediately followed the expiration
of Alexander Graham Bell’s telephone patents in 1894 to what he termed “access
competition” between telephone operating companies (Bell and non-Bell) that did
not interconnect. In so doing, Mueller downplayed the extent to which access
competition was itself the result of deliberate political choice, and provided no
real explanation for the rapid expansion of the telephone network within specific
localities—such as New York and Chicago—in which access competition was but
one, and by no means the most important, of the challenges that network providers
confronted.
15. Chandler, Visible Hand; Hughes, American Genesis; Cronon, Nature’s
Metropolis.
16. Cronon, “Place for Stories,” 1349, 1371.
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political history and social science.17 While this body of historical
writing does not yet possess the theoretical self-confidence of Chand-
lerian business history, Hughesian history of technology, or Cronon-
ian environmental history, it has enough common features to signal
the emergence of a “political economy synthesis.” While “political
economy synthesis” lacks the pithiness of the “frontier thesis,” or even
the “organizational synthesis,” it has the advantage of juxtaposing two
inextricably intertwined yet irreducibly distinct realms of human ex-
perience: namely, polity and economy.18 For the new institutionalists,
institutions begat institutions and ideals spawned ideals. While they
emphasize the agency of governmental institutions, they characterize
the state not as an agent of change, but, rather, as a structuring pres-
ence whose effects no group or individual willed.19 Scholarship that
fits under this rubric has been published on many topics, including
transportation, banking, manufacturing, military procurement, public
works, finance, and communications.20
The new institutionalism provides a fresh angle of vision for ex-
ploring the political economy of the nineteenth-century telegraph net-
work. One of the more remarkable aspects of this history was the cul-
ture of entrepreneurship that flourished among telegraph inventors in
the 1870s. In an astonishingly brief interval, a small group of inven-
tors, of whom the best known today are Thomas Edison andAlexander
Graham Bell, devised—and obtained patents for—a galaxy of remark-
able inventions that included electric lighting, the phonograph, the
telephone, and a form of broadband telegraphy known as the quadru-
plex. How can this sudden burst of creativity be explained? What
inspired the “technological enthusiasm” that Hughes considered to
be one of the defining features of the age?21
17. A parallel shift is occurring in historical writing on economic institutions
in Europe. See, for example, Kipping, “Business–Government Relations”; Berg
and Bruland, “Culture, Institutions, and Technological Transitions”; and Mokyr,
“Political Economy.”
18. For a related discussion, see Caporoso and Levine, Political Economy, 6,
28, 31.
19. On this point, see Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In,” esp. 20–21.
20. Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization; Usselman, Regulating Railroad
Innovation; Berk, Alternative Tracks; Edling, Revolution in Favor of Govern-
ment; Sylla, “Experimental Federalism”; Lamoreaux, Merger Movement; Einhorn,
Property Rules; Einhorn, American Taxation, American Slavery; Misa, Nation of
Steel; Wilson, Business of Civil War; Henkin, Postal Age; Howe, What Hath God
Wrought; John, Spreading the News; John, “Private Enterprise, Public Good?”;
John, “Vail.”
21. Hughes, American Genesis, 1–3. While Hughes accorded considerable sig-
nificance to this entrepreneurial culture, he opposed the parceling out of credit for
specific inventions. “It is futile,” Hughes observed, “for an inventor, a historian of
invention, or even the courts to attempt to prove who invented amachine, a device,
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Part of the answer to these questions can be found in the tele-
graph network’s internal dynamics. Historians have long assumed
that Western Union in the 1870s was a natural monopoly, more-or-
less impervious to competition. In fact, it was relatively easy for an
upstart telegraph promoter to underbid Western Union by stringing
wire betweenmajor commercial centers. In the language of economics,
few economies of scale existed to “naturally” discourage competitors;
as a consequence, would-be rivals had a major incentive not only
to parallel Western Union’s lines, but also to purchase telegraphic
inventions to improve their competitive position.22 And so long as
competition persisted, a robust sellers’ market would exist for new
technical contrivances.
Equally significant was a supportive legal environment. Each of
these inventions had been hastened by the expansive safeguards law-
makers built into the patent system to give inventors a panoply of time-
specific legal rights.23 Inventors also benefited from a state-based char-
tering policy that discouraged monopolies among telegraph network
providers.24 Though Western Union had negotiated with railroads
hundreds of exclusive right-of-way agreements, nothing prevented a
would-be rival from securing a corporate charter. States granted tele-
graph charters, and throughout the Unites States, state legislatures
had emulated the example of New York, which, in 1848, enacted a
or process such as the steam engine, the telephone, or the transformer.” Alexander
Graham Bell, in Hughes’s view, did not invent the telephone; rather, Bell combined
in a distinctive ensemble a telephone system that embodied a particular applica-
tion of the principles of variable resistance and induction. Hughes, Networks of
Power, 94, 95. For a related discussion, see Carlson, “Innovation and the Modern
Corporation.” In the 1870s, Carlson observed, a “unique market” existed for tele-
graph inventors who could supply “blockbuster” inventions to Western Union or
its rivals (207). Why this market existed at this moment in time is a topic Carlson
left for others to explore.
22. The absence of what would today be called economies of scale among
telegraph network providers was well known to network insiders. “The telegraphic
business is in effect a business of writing a vast number of short letters for the
public,” explained Western Union president William Orton in a public interview
in 1875: “One man can only write a given number of letters in a given time,
be they long or short. The cost of writing is not reduced by an increase in the
number written, because when the number exceeds the capacity of the present staff
additional writing or operating assistants must be employed.” Quoted in Operator
3 (15 August 1875). Orton registered analogous doubts about the benefits of high-
volume throughput in his private business correspondence. Orton to George H.
Mumford, 16 May 1870, president’s letterbooks, Western Union Records. Similar
sentiments found their way into the press. The benefits of doing a “wholesale
business” in the telegraph, opined an editorialist in the Nation in 1872, were less
than in any other business. “Would a Postal Telegraph be Cheap?” Nation 15 (19
December 1872): 403.
23. For an introduction to the vast literature on patent policy, see Usselman
and John, “Patent Politics.”
24. Nonnenmacher, “State Promotion.”
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general incorporation law for telegraph network providers to prevent
promoters allied with telegraph inventor Samuel F. B. Morse from
monopolizing the new medium. This antimonopoly legislation had
the desired effect, and a host of would-be-telegraph magnates sprang
up on the lucrative intercity routes.
In the 1870s, the most important rivalry among telegraph network
providers pitted Western Union against the Atlantic & Pacific and
American Union, each of which had the backing of Jay Gould, an un-
usually shrewd and imaginative financier with a genius for exploiting
opportunities the political economy spawned. So long as this rivalry
persisted, a thriving market would exist for telegraphic inventions. To
meet the demand, Edison, Bell, and a gaggle of lesser-known inven-
tors, sold, or threatened to sell, a variety of telegraph-related patents to
the highest bidder. Bell turned to the telephone only after he had been
hired to patent an acoustic telegraph to sell to either Western Union
or Gould. Edison provided his quadruplex to bothWestern Union and
Gould in an audacious bit of legal jugglery that preoccupied some of
the country’s leading attorneys. With the money he obtained from the
sale of this patent, Edison built the celebrated laboratory complex in
Menlo Park, New Jersey, at which he invented his phonograph and
electric light.25
While telegraph network providers relied primarily on state legis-
latures to obtain rights-of-way, telephone network providers obtained
from city councils their legal authority to string wire. Municipal fran-
chises were negotiated one-by-one, and, in contrast to telegraph char-
ters, were often quite detailed. Some specified maximum rates and
performance standards; a few even had expiration dates. The 1889
franchise for the Chicago Telephone Company, for example, expired
in 1909. For telephone network providers, to a much greater ex-
tent than for telegraph network providers, competition was always
contrived.26
Telephone franchises were of special significance in the nation’s
major cities, the home to the largest and most lucrative of the Bell-
associated network providers. Without a municipal franchise, it was
impossible to secure rights-of-way on crowded city streets. And even
with a franchise, gaining rights-of-way could be contentious. In the
1880s, for example, hundreds ofmunicipalities forced telephone com-
panies to bury thousands of miles of telephone wire, an expensive un-
dertaking for which they received no immediate financial return. Mu-
nicipal franchises shaped the business strategy of network providers
in various ways. Incumbents relied on them to forestall competition;
25. Israel, Edison, chap. 8.
26. Priest, “Utility Regulation.”
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insurgents to enter the market. To be sure, it was hard for a rival to
enter the field, even under the best of circumstances. Yet once a net-
work provider had strung its wires in a particular locality, it could
hardly ignore municipal politics. Manufacturers confronted with bur-
densome municipal ordinances could plausibly threaten to shut up
their plants and relocate in a more hospitable locality. The Chicago
Telephone Company, however, could not move to Milwaukee.
Franchise politics became particularly contentious following the
emergence in the 1890s of a constellation of non-Bell telephone equip-
ment suppliers who were determined to open up the telephone net-
work to non-Bell network providers. To create amarket for theirwares,
these manufacturers lobbied tirelessly, and with considerable suc-
cess, to create a favorable legal climate for non-Bell or “independent”
network providers. To meet the potentially devastating challenge
that this new political environment posed, Bell-associated network
providers launched an aggressive campaign to popularize telephone
service. In New York and Chicago, the cornerstone of this campaign
was the introduction of a variety of pay-as-you-go calling plans known
as “measured service.” In conjunction with a number of technical ad-
vances, these new calling plans enormously increased the size of the
telephone network. In Chicago, for example, the total number of tele-
phones spiked from 10,000 in 1893 to 300,000 1911, while in the same
interval the company’s capital investment increased from $3 million
to $30 million.27
Measured service transformed conventional assumptions about
telephone usage in the nation’s largest cities. Prior to the 1890s, most
network providers offered users unlimited local service in return for
the payment of a fixed monthly fee. Flat rates were popular with
large users, such as lumber dealers, who grew accustomed to mak-
ing dozens and sometimes hundreds of local calls every day. Yet so
long as the monthly fees remained high, they blocked the extension
of telephone service to the vast majority of city dwellers. Although
measured service rarely took hold in small cities and towns, by 1900
it had become ubiquitous in the nation’s leading cities. Some calling
plans combined fixed and variable charges; others did not. By 1906,
over half of Chicago’s 114,000 telephones had no fixed charges at all,
much like public telephones today.28 These telephones, which were
popularly known as nickel-in-the-slots, offered a rudimentary level
of telephone service for as little as a nickel a day, or $1.50 a month,
which was all the vast majority of city dwellers desired. Bell man-
agers installed thousands in boarding houses and private residences.
27. Hibbard, Hello Goodbye, 179.
28. Jackson, Telephone Situation, 33, 112.
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To make a telephone call, users put a coin in the pay box, just as they
would at a public telephone station. There was no telephone bill,
and no possibility that a user might be confronted with unexpected
long-distance charges. Eachmonth, telephone collectors stopped by to
count and collect the nickels; no other accounting procedure was re-
quired. Nothing didmore, in the opinion of electrical engineer Dugald
Jackson, to popularize the new medium.29
The advantages of these new calling plans figured prominently in
the elaborate advertising campaigns that big-city operating company
marketing departments launched around 1900. These campaigns did
their best to instill what one Chicago operating company manager
called the “telephone habit” in the masses as well as the classes, and
among women as well as men.30 Marketing departments proved par-
ticularly adept at publicizing the still somewhat novel idea that the
telephone was suitable not only for narrowly instrumental tasks, such
as the ordering of groceries, but also for a wider range of cultural prac-
tices such as the maintenance of social relationships with neighbors
and friends.31
Popularizing the telephone in the nation’s largest cities owed
much to the political economy in which network providers oper-
ated. Municipal politics was intrinsically adversarial. City officials
possessed the authority not only to regulate maximum rates and per-
formance standards, but also to franchise new entrants and even, in
certain localities, to buy out network providers and operate them as a
branch of city government. Indeed, the municipal buy-out of privately
29. Jackson, Telephone Situation, 22.
30. Hibbard, Hello Goodbye, 210. Electric power companies mounted parallel
advertising campaigns to popularize an energy-intensive lifestyle. On these cam-
paigns, see Platt, Electric City and Sicilia, “Selling Power.”
31. The advertising campaigns of the Bell-associated telephone operating com-
panies in New York and Chicago are documented in the advertisements that their
marketing departments ran beginning around 1900 in the New York Times and the
Chicago Tribune. Since these advertisements were intended to sell telephone ser-
vice, rather than to burnish the public image of telephone network providers, they
are a more accurate reflection of the business strategy of telephone managers than
the better-known public relations campaign orchestrated by AT&T. The primary
objective of the AT&T public relations campaign was not to sell telephone service,
but to forestall hostile government legislation. Taken together, these operating
company advertisements raise questions about the claim of the urban sociologist
Claude Fischer that telephone managers did not begin to advertise telephone so-
ciability widely until the 1920s. Fischer, America Calling, 75–84. In New York and
Chicago, operating company advertisements had been trumpeting the possibilities
of telephone sociability since at least 1900. The sophistication of these advertis-
ing campaigns is abundantly documented in the scrapbook of advertising circulars
circa 1900 compiled by a Milwaukee Bell operating company employee that can be
found in the records of the Wisconsin Telephone Company at the AT&T Archives
and History Center in San Antonio, Texas.
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owned enterprises, beginningwith streetcar lines and electrical power
plants, was the cherished dream of many US-based municipal owner-
ship advocates, who in the 1890s began to call municipal franchises
“public utilities,” a new coinage that, at least initially, was a rallying
cry for opponents of private ownership and operation.32
The distinctiveness of the US political economy is highlighted by
a comparison with Canada, the country whose telephone network
most closely resembled that in the United States. Canadian munic-
ipalities retained far less authority over telephone rates and perfor-
mance standards.33 As a consequence, Canadian network providers
had less incentive to innovate. In the United States, incentives for
innovation were substantial. In many cities, including New York and
Chicago, local officials routinely extorted large sums from network
providers to forestall hostile legislation, such as a phony franchise
grant for a would-be rival network provider. To break the cycle of
corruption, even public figures hostile to socialism endorsed munici-
pal ownership in the hope that it might purify city politics. In such a
political climate, popularization had the potential to create political
constituencies that werewary ofmunicipalization, and, in this way, to
parry a potentially devastating political assault. Had telephone man-
agers not popularized the telephone, potential new entrants might
have enjoyed a broader measure of popular support, while municipal
officials might have faced less opposition in pushing for a municipal
buy-out of the company’s plant.
Popularizing urban telephony generated the revenue that AT&T
relied on to build its much-touted long-distance telephone network.
Long-distance telephony was a major technical achievement, yet in
its early years its capacity remained limited and its cost high. As late
as 1941, 98 percent of all telephone calls connected parties located
within the boundaries of an individual state.34 The limitations of the
long-distance network are worth underscoring, since its significance
has been long exaggerated by AT&T publicists and the historians who
have followed their lead. Bell network providers vanquished their
rivals neither because of their superior long-distance grid, nor even
because of their superior regional coverage, but, rather, because they
popularized local telephone service in response to a political chal-
lenge that was most intense in the nation’s largest cities.
32. This generalization is based on a keyword search of the New York Times
and Chicago Tribune. Prior to the 1890s, the phrase “works of public utility” was
relatively common; as a collective noun, however, “public utility” was virtually
unknown.
33. MacDougall, “People’s Telephone” (2004), 17–18, 48–51, 188–195.
34. Page, Bell Telephone System, 177.
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In the half century following the Civil War, the political economy
shaped the telegraph and telephone networks in myriad ways. In the
case of the telegraph, antimonopoly sentiment fostered a culture of
entrepreneurship that generated a remarkable spate of inventions. In
case of the telephone, municipal politics hastened the popularization
of a medium that had, before this time, been confined to a tiny elite.
These outcomes are best explained not as the supposedly inexorable
product of technological imperatives and market trends, but, rather,
as a result of the peculiar mix of incentives created by the political
economy of the American state, a political economy that dated back to
the early republic, and that spawned, in the 1870s, an entrepreneurial
ferment that marked the beginning of America’s progressive age.
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